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In 1978, Congress and President Carter gave their approval to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),' which promised to curtail U.S. intelli-
gence community electronic surveillance excesses with regard to Americans.
FISA mandated the creation of a special court to hear government electronic
surveillance requests for foreign intelligence collection, and thus subjected in-
telligence community activities to a defined public law for the first time in our
nation's history. But today, more than eleven years after the court was actually
established and began passing judgment on electronic surveillance requests, not
a single warrant has ever been denied. To be specific, some 5,160 applications
were approved through the end of 1989.2
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Desert Shield, and is assigned to the Joint Intelligence Center, Iraq Regional Intelligence Task Force,
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Operational Intelligence Center. The author thanks Alison Smith for her assistance in the preparation
of this article.
**Due to national security concerns, several United States Government entities, including the
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I. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1982)
[hereinafter FISA].
2. This figure understates the total number of persons affected, as it bears no correlation to the
number of U.S. persons targeted, since many warrants are issued successively and do not count
toward the total. Additionally, a single order may authorize electronic surveillance at more than one
location. However, the figure does not reflect only de novo warrants; it includes new orders as well
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The number of approved warrant applications suggests that the mere estab-
lishment of the oversight procedure offers no more protection for civil liberties
than existed before FISA's passage. Its perfect record calls into question the
practical effectiveness of the act, its review procedures, the executive branch's
internal review mechanism, and the judiciary's ability to oversee the entire
process. However, prior to reaching any conclusions, one must examine the
circumstances surrounding FISA's birth and operation and the law itself.
I. Background
The application of ever-improving surveillance technology to intelligence col-
lection harbors a series of implications for government policy, individual liber-
ties, and constitutional rights. As Justice Brandeis noted in 1928 in his prophetic
dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States:
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with [the] means of espionage is
not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which the
Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in
court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences
of the home. 3
Almost fifty years later a congressional subcommittee again sounded the alarm:
"[t]he dilemma inherent in a democratic society-between ensuring internal and
national security without jeopardizing the civil liberties of citizens and demo-
cratic rights of the society-is reflected in the use and control of surveillance
technology. '" 4 This concern highlights the most problematic of the legal diffi-
culties facing the conduct of U.S. intelligence activities, that of establishing the
legal distinction between foreign powers or their agents on the one hand, and
domestic groups or individuals on the other.
Questionable and seemingly inappropriate and misguided intelligence
community activities were made public in the press in 1970.5 The need for a
statutory safeguard to protect Americans from unlawful electronic surveillance
first came to light three years later during the Watergate investigation. These
revelations spawned congressional inquiries and the formation of an executive
commission.
as extensions of old warrants. Telephone interview with Mary C. Lawton, Esq., Counsel for Intel-
ligence Policy, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, Department of Justice, in Washington, D.C.
(Jan. 10, 1989); Attorney General's Message to the President of the Senate, Exec. Comm. No. 2,859
(Apr. 13, 1990) (providing 1989 FISA figure).
3. 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928).
4. STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDI-
CIARY, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY 1976, POLICY AND IMPLICATIONS: AN
ANALYSIS AND COMPENDIUM OF MATERIALS 15 (Comm. Print 1976).
5. See, e.g., Pyle, CONUS Intelligence: The Army Watches Civilian Politics, I WASH.
MONTHLY 4 (1970) (revealing the extent of the army's domestic intelligence program).
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The exposure of the extent of the army's domestic program drew substantial
press coverage, and both the Senate Subcommittees on Constitutional Rights and
the House Armed Services Committee announced shortly thereafter their inten-
tions to hold hearings on the matter. It was later learned that other intelligence
community activities involved significant domestic operations, which resulted in
President Ford's creation of the Rockefeller Commission in January 1975 to in-
vestigate Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) statutory violations. The Senate
Committee on Governmental Operations created a special committee, chaired by
Senator Frank Church (referred to as the Church Committee), 6 in January 1975,
and the House of Representatives followed suit one month later when it undertook
a special investigation through a committee chaired by Representative Otis Pike.
These bodies uncovered instances of political spying, mail opening, surveil-
lance of Americans, and assassination plots, among others. The Church Com-
mittee concluded that every President since Franklin D. Roosevelt had asserted
the right to use and actually authorized the conduct of warrantless electronic
surveillance against American citizens. 7
In light of these abuses, and owing to operational concerns 8 and the extremely
high probability that communications taking place wholly within the United
States or between the United States and a foreign country involved Americans,
Congress saw a need to extend fourth amendment rights to the intelligence field.
This effort flew in the face of historical precedent, as up to that point Congress
had consistently deferred to presidential authority and failed to take an active role
in the intelligence area. For more than a century, the House and Senate did not
directly legislate on intelligence matters. Simply put, Congress did not want to
become intimately acquainted with intelligence activities. Intelligence commit-
tees were not even established until the mid-1970s. 9 Between 1947 and 1975
Congress either rejected or ignored over 200 measures to increase its oversight
role in the intelligence field. Successive presidents justified their secrecy over
intelligence operations on the basis of national security or defense consider-
ations. But with the downing of Gary Powers's U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over
the Soviet Union, the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation in Cuba, the U.S.-
financed anti-Allende campaign in Chile, the exposure of extensive domestic
military intelligence activities, and improper CIA activities entailing burglaries,
buggings, wiretaps, illegal drug experimentation, and assassination attempts,
6. The Church Committee's official name was the Senate Select Committee to Study Govern-
mental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. See S. Res. 21, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975).
7. See Pub. L. No. 95-511, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (92 Stat. 1783) 3908.
8. See supra note 4.
9. See S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (establishing Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence); H. Res. 658, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (establishing House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence).
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widespread public outrage gave rise to increased congressional interest and ac-
tivism in the intelligence field.' FISA owes its existence to this confluence of
events. But it did not come without a fight. In fact, FISA was the Senate's fifth
attempt since Watergate to rein in the president's "right" to conduct warrantless
electronic surveillance. ''
II. FISA's Implementation
A. WHAT iS FISA?
FISA provides a statutory procedure for the authorization of warrants to use
electronic surveillance in order to obtain foreign intelligence when Americans are
involved or when such surveillance is conducted in the United States. FISA applies
to the entire intelligence community' 2 and extends protections to U.S. persons,
defining the latter as U.S. citizens and lawful resident aliens. 13 Upon its imple-
mentation, the warrant requirement was extended to all electronic surveillance
conducted within the United States, except that section 102 of FISA provides that
the president, through the attorney general, may authorize electronic surveillance
without a court order for as long as one year if certain conditions are met. 14
B. WHY DID FISA COME ABOUT?
It was primarily intended to curtail the activities of the National Security
Agency (NSA). The Church Committee had found that NSA assisted other
federal agencies in compiling information concerning individuals on watch
lists.' 5 These agencies provided names of persons and organizations to NSA
10. See Meason, Military Intelligence and the American Citizen, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
541, 555 (1989).
11. Prior attempts included: S. 3197, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1976); S. 743, National Security Surveillance Act of 1975, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975);
S. 4062, Freedom from Surveillance Act of 1974, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); S. 2820, Surveillance
Practices and Procedures Act of 1973, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
12. It is comprised of all Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence elements, including the
Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, defense reconnaissance program offices,
and the intelligence components of the military services. Non-DoD entities include the Central
Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence elements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug
Enforcement Administration, and the Departments of State, Energy, Transportation (U.S. Coast
Guard), and Treasury.
13. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i) (1982).
14. See id. § 1802(a). Those conditions are if the surveillance targets communications used
exclusively between foreign powers, or technical intelligence (intelligence other than spoken com-
munications) from the property or premises under open and exclusive control of a foreign power, and
there is no substantial likelihood that the surveillance would acquire the communications of U.S.
persons. See id.
15. Watch lists entail the systematic use of individual names, subjects, locations, and so on, as
a basis for monitoring messages between individuals when one of the communicants is at a foreign
location. Between 1967 and 1973 the cumulative total of names of U.S. individuals on the watch list
approximated 1,700, with roughly 450 names related to narcotics activities. See 5 Intelligence
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in an attempt to obtain information that was available in foreign com-
munications as a by-product of NSA's foreign intelligence and counterintel-
ligence missions. 16
One of those missions is the interception and exploitation of foreign electro-
magnetic signals information. While, in practice, NSA's activities are extremely
complex and utilize the latest technological developments, the process by which
NSA intercepts foreign signals can be reduced to a few easily understood steps.
Communication interception sites are located in many countries around the
world. NSA intercepts messages passing over international lines of communica-
tion, some of which have one terminal in the United States. Traveling over these
lines are the messages of Americans, most of which are irrelevant to NSA's
mission. NSA often has no means of excluding such messages from those it
intercepts. However, it does have the capability to select particular messages
from those it intercepts that are of foreign intelligence value.
NSA's approach to collection is similar to a trawler's approach to catching fish;
while the latter collects everything that happens to get caught in its net, so too does
NSA. NSA's computers "fish" for key words in telephone calls, telegrams, tel-
exes, and telefaxes. After processing its "catch," NSA discards inappropriate
messages. Most international communications of Americans are discarded since
they do not meet foreign intelligence criteria. Having selected messages of pos-
sible intelligence value, NSA monitors (reads) them and uses the information it
obtains as the basis for reports that it furnishes to the other intelligence agencies. 17
NSA utilizes the latest technology, as evidenced by its use of a series of the latest
and most powerful Cray supercomputers to break enciphered communications. 18
Despite its primary goal of limiting watch list activity, FISA arguably came
into being as much to facilitate surveillance as it did to prevent its abuse. After
the public's ire was raised following the disclosures of illegal and improper
intelligence community surveillance of American citizens, the intelligence com-
munity found it increasingly difficult to persuade U.S. telephone companies to
cooperate in tapping telephones for fear of lawsuits. And even when the intel-
ligence community was able to convince them to cooperate with its efforts, some
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents who applied the taps were
reluctant to become involved also due to the possibility of lawsuits. 19
Activities and the Rights of Americans: Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. to Study Govern-
mental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1975) (prepared
statement of Lieutenant General Lew Allen, Jr., Director, National Security Agency). Watch list
activity associated with this period ceased operationally in the summer of 1973 and was officially
terminated in the fall of that year.
16. Id. at 16.
17. See 2 id. at 308.
18. For a more detailed examination of NSA, see Meason, Light, on a Dark, Complex Land-
scape, 17 DEF. & FOREIGN AFF. 19, 23 (Oct. 1989).
19. See Nov. 26, 1989, letter from the Honorable Stansfield Turner, former Director of Central
Intelligence, to the author, at I [hereinafter Turner].
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C. JUDICIAL BASIS
Although the Supreme Court consistently refused to tackle the question of
warrantless electronic surveillance in the national security context, virtually
every court that had addressed the issue utilizing pre-FISA law concluded that
the president did have the inherent power to conduct such surveillance to collect
foreign intelligence, and that this type of surveillance constituted an exception to
the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. 20 Despite this overwhelming
precedent, the passage of FISA was paved judicially by the 1976 decision of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Zweibon v.
Mitchel.2 1 This opinion required that a warrant be obtained before a wiretap was
installed on a domestic organization that was neither an agent of, nor acting in
collaboration with, a foreign power. Although the holding was narrowly defined,
the court noted in dictum that "an analysis of the policies implicated by foreign
security surveillance indicates that, absent exigent circumstances, all warrantless
electronic surveillance is unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional . -22
III. FISA Examined
A. STATUTORY DETAILS
The statute requires a judicial warrant before the following activities are con-
ducted in the United States for foreign intelligence purposes:
(a) The acquisition of a wire or radio communication sent to or from the
United States by intentionally targeting a known United States person (a citizen
or resident alien) in the United States under circumstances in which the person
has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law
enforcement purposes;
(b) A wiretap in the United States to intercept a wire communication, such as
a telephone or telegram communication;
(c) The acquisition of a private radio transmission in which all of the com-
municants are located within the United States; or
20. See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 912-14 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982); United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 890 (1977); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881
(1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960
(1974). The Supreme Court specifically declined to address this issue in United States v. United
States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 308, 321-22 (1972) (known as the Keith case). In Camara v.
Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967), it made clear that the requirements of the fourth amendment
may change when differing governmental interests are at stake, and in Keith the Court noted that
governmental interests in national security investigations differ substantially from those in criminal
investigations. 407 U.S. at 321-24, cited in United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 72 (2d Cir.
1984).
21. 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
22. 516 F.2d at 614.
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(d) The use in the United States of any electronic, mechanical, or other
surveillance device to acquire information other than a wire communication or
radio communication under circumstances in which the person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement
purposes.23
It also established what is known today as the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Court, or FISA court: seven federal district court judges, appointed by the
Chief Justice of the United States, serve staggered seven-year terms to hear
applications in camera and ex parte for the approval of domestic electronic
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes.24 In practice, the court meets in a
secure room in the Department of Justice once every three to four weeks. Unlike
in the criminal arena, agents and intelligence officers do not know which of the
seven judges will be presiding on any particular day and so cannot hold their
applications back until a judge viewed as more lenient toward surveillance re-
quests is sitting.
A judge must issue a warrant authorizing electronic surveillance if the gov-
ernment states, and the judge finds that:
(a) the application has been approved by the attorney general;
(b) on the basis of the facts submitted to the court, there is a "justified belief"
that the target of the surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power;
(c) the facility or place at which the surveillance is directed is being used or
is about to be used by a foreign power or agent;
(d) there is a statement of the proposed minimization procedures to be fol-
lowed regarding the acquisition and retention of information relating to
Americans that is not foreign intelligence information;
(e) there is a detailed description of the nature of the information sought and
the type of activities to be surveilled;
(f) the executive branch certifies the information sought is foreign intelli-
gence information that cannot reasonably be obtained by normal investi-
gative techniques;
(g) a statement of how the surveillance will be conducted, including whether
physical entry is required, is provided; and
(h) the time frame for the surveillance is stated.26
23. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f) (1982).
24. Id. § 1803.
25. The current members of the FISA court are: Joyce Hens Green, District of Columbia,
Presiding Judge; Sidney N. Aronovitz, Southern District of Florida; Edward J. Devitt, Minnesota;
Frank H. Freedman, Massachusetts; Wendell A. Miles, Western District of Michigan; Herbert F.
Murray, Maryland; and Ralph G. Thompson, Western District of Oklahoma. It is the policy of FISA
judges neither to grant interviews nor to answer written questions relating either to their role on the
court or to the court's operation.
26. 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (1982).
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Careful statutory analysis reveals, among other things, that FISA judges have,
in the vast majority of cases, no actual discretion in determining whether warrant
applications will be granted. FISA only requires that the eight criteria be for-
mally met, a requirement that is unrelated to the factual basis for asking for a
warrant. While the court must determine that there is a "justified belief" that the
identity of the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or its agent
and that the place to be surveilled is or will be used by the target, a showing of
probable cause is not required to link these determinations to supporting facts
(the need for such surveillance). Thus, under most circumstances, the judges
cannot look behind the application for its basis or necessity. The only instance in
which a FISA judge could question the executive branch's foreign intelligence
certification is when the target is a U.S. person and the judge has found the
certification to be clearly erroneous. Since FISA court proceedings rarely in-
volve the direct targeting of U.S. persons, it would be very unusual if the FISA
court ever turned down a warrant request under such a system. In short, one
could argue that the FISA court is nothing more than a useless rubber stamp.
Proponents of FISA contend that it authorizes electronic surveillance only
under the double safeguards of an independent review by a neutral magistrate and
the application of a "justified belief" standard to the request. They also believe
FISA protects constitutional freedoms and prohibits the executive branch from
conducting warrantless electronic surveillance on the strength of its own unilat-
eral determination that national security justifies its use, while at the same time,
not prohibiting the legitimate domestic use of electronic surveillance. A 1982
report by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence stated:
The fact that the Court has never denied a government application for an electronic
surveillance order has produced some criticism of the Act's and the Court's usefulness.
The Committee, in addition to its other oversight activities, continues to engage in a
periodic examination of a representative sample of court order applications. It is the
Committee's belief, based on these activities and examinations, that the government's
record in this area is generally reflective not of a rubber stamp court but of applications
which have been carefully prepared and rigorously reviewed so as to insure compliance
with the Act.
27
At the time of this report, concern had been expressed after just 750 requests,
less than one sixth of the current total, had been approved.
B. OFFICE PRACTICES
The Justice Department's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review maintains
the records pertaining to FISA. The attorney general delegated the ability to
classify documents through the top secret level to the Counsel for Intelligence
Policy.
27. H.R. REP. No. 974, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1982).
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When faced with a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for access to
records, the Justice Department's policy is neither to confirm nor to deny
whether it was or is involved in a specific FISA-authorized surveillance activity.
This policy includes neither confirming nor denying that it maintains or does not
maintain information concerning whether an individual is the subject of a FISA
application. The Justice Department also will not divulge whether records exist
relating to applications to the FISA court. Its stance is based upon the belief that
such information has a direct relation to intelligence sources, methods, and
activities, and to the foreign relations of the nation. Thus, while details relating
to FISA-authorized surveillance may not necessarily be classified at the time of
the receipt of an FOIA request, the information is believed to be "classifiable."
Office personnel cite the need not to disclose such information because the
information would reveal to hostile intelligence organizations which of their
agents operating in the United States had been identified. Additionally, it would
also reveal intelligence sources against which hostile services could take effec-
tive countermeasures.
C. FISA's TRACK RECORD
Trial and appeals challenges to the warrants, ranging from attacks on FISA's
constitutionality itself,2 8 the constitutionality of its ex parte and in camera pro-
cedures, 29 and its minimization practices, 30 to allegations concerning the in-
fringement of the separation of powers and political question doctrines, 3' and the
improper use of FISA in criminal investigations, 32 to name but a few, have been
unsuccessful.
It should be noted, however, that contrary to the opinions held by many of
those associated with the court's activities, the FISA court has rejected one
application. During the Carter administration, the Justice Department took the
position that physical searches, or so-called black-bag jobs, in addition to elec-
tronic surveillance, could and should be subject to authorization by FISA court
judges, if not under the power of FISA itself, then under their powers as federal
district court judges. Two such test cases were pending in late 1980. With the
change in administrations the next year, the Justice Department reversed its
position in a memorandum attached to a request for a physical search warrant.
The FISA court subsequently held it had no jurisdiction over this area.33 In so
28. See, e.g., United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77-78 (2d Cir. 1984).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1988).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 476 (9th Cir. 1987).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1314 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1462-64 (1 1th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 937 (1988).
33. Telephone interview with Daniel B. Silver, Esq., former General Counsel, National Security
Agency and Central Intelligence Agency, in Washington, D.C. (May 5, 1989).
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doing it denied judicial review of physical entries in favor of executive approval
of such matters.34
IV. Observations
While one of the purposes of FISA was to protect fourth amendment civil
liberties, its utility in this regard must be questioned. With each passing year, and
as FISA maintains its perfect electronic surveillance record, criticisms appear to
gain greater credence. Is the FISA review procedure working as envisaged, or is
it simply a rubber stamp, with fourth amendment concerns having been over-
taken by operational imperatives? Should the statute be changed to allow the
judges to look behind the warrant application in determining the propriety of all
surveillance requests? Have the judges, placed in the position of making these
decisions armed with information available to only a select few, been able to
maintain total impartiality in spite of having been exposed to the tree of knowl-
edge? Would granting greater access to America's secrets in regard to supporting
documentation exacerbate this potential problem? Finally, in what ways can or
should FISA be changed? There are no definitive answers, but several general
observations can be made about the intelligence community, and specific factors
relating to FISA's operation can be addressed.
A. "HERD MENTALITY"
First, there is, generally speaking, a "herd mentality" within intelligence
circles. One is quickly absorbed by the system. One's thinking changes, and
one's views come to reflect the attitude of a hawk rather than a dove. Perhaps the
situation is akin to the changes police officers undergo as they are continually
bombarded by the worst society has to offer. Police officers are not normally in
contact with citizens during life's happier moments. Similarly, intelligence per-
sonnel operate in a high pressure environment and are faced on a daily basis with
coups, terrorist activities, civil wars, and a wide range of other conflicts. Their
views become skewed and entrenched. As FISA judges have been granted lim-
ited access to the system, they are not beyond its influence. According to one
knowledgeable official, evidence of this has been displayed in the past. At least
a few of the judges assigned to the FISA court have acted like giddy school
children when viewing videotapes of surveillance operations, getting excited and
making impassioned gestures toward the screen from their chairs. It would
appear that some judges have not maintained their impartiality.
34. Congress has recently taken up this issue in § 14 of S. 2726, Counterintelligence Improve-
ments Act of 1990, 10 1st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). The proposal would have expanded FISA to cover
black-bag jobs. As it was not introduced until late in the session and subsequently died in Congress,
it will be reintroduced next year.
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B. CIRCULAR REPORTING
Second, circular reporting is a pervasive disease within the intelligence com-
munity. Information is reported on topic A by analyst 1 and subsequently re-
ported elsewhere. Analyst 2, frequently without an attempt to determine addi-
tional information, utilizes that report and draws inferences from it for an
analysis of topic B. This process can be repeated endlessly. One can see the
obvious veracity problems of such a system as this chain stretches further and
further. How does one ensure that such a scenario has not been a factor in putting
together a basis to ask for an electronic surveillance warrant? Only scrupulous
attention to detail can cure this malady, and fortunately in the FISA arena such
attention during the pre-FISA court submission stages has all but vanquished the
disease.
Prior to the Carter administration no formal mechanism existed nor was be-
lieved to be needed for the review of electronic surveillance decisions. During
the Nixon years, for example, then-Director of Central Intelligence (DCI),
William Colby, brought only extremely sensitive surveillance operations to the
attention of the National Security Council and to then-Secretary of State, Henry
Kissinger, in particular. This was done pursuant to Mr. Colby's own initiative
and was a way to "touch base with Henry."
35
During President Carter's term a formal review was established in 1977, the
year prior to FISA's enactment. The review was accomplished by an interagency
panel composed of the Secretaries of Defense and State and presided over by the
DCI, who was (and is) also the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. In
testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, then-DCI, Stans-
field Turner, stated there had been no meeting of his panel at which all surveil-
lance requests were granted.36 But owing to the difficulties noted previously,37
while there were a large number of approvals, there were actually very few
surveillance operations conducted.3 s It is quite apparent that, owing to their
access to information, this group (collectively and individually) had the ability to
give a more thorough review to the surveillance applications than is presently
possible by FISA judges. Certainly, the individual members of the FISA court do
not have the same access or knowledge and cannot provide as thorough a review
as their predecessors were capable of giving.
As to the question of whether the members of the interagency panel actually
exercised their capabilities, Admiral Turner notes that:
35. Telephone interview with the Honorable William Colby, former Director of Central Intelli-
gence, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 16, 1989).
36. See Testimony of Admiral Stansfield Turner, Before Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence,
Subcomm. on Intelligence and the Rights of Americans, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978, at 49, cited in J. BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE: A REPORT ON AMERICA'S MOST SECRET
AGENCY 467 (1983).
37. See supra note 4.
38. See supra note 27, at 1.
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I turned down just as many applications for surveillance under the FISA procedures as
I did under the committee procedure before it. I often found it wrenching to passjudgment that an individual under suspicion was very likely an agent of a foreign
power. There were times when I was totally convinced of it, but turned the application
down because I did not believe someone with an outside, totally objective view, would
necessarily concur.
39
Thorough reviews were undertaken, not necessarily due to compliance with rigid
procedural guidelines, but rather owing to the inherent professional knowledge
possessed by members of the panel. The preapproval application formulation
process at that time was not as structured, nor did it provide as rigorous a
technical review prior to the final determination stage, as has been subsequently
put into effect.
The review procedure currently in place and established to scrutinize FISA
requests before they arrive at the Office of the Attorney General is a deliberate
and painstaking process, much more rigorous than that found in the criminal
warrant arena. Applications originate in any of three entities: the military, the
FBI, or the CIA. In practice, the FBI requests the overwhelming majority of
warrants; the military and CIA are virtually uninvolved.
In the FBI context, after information has been obtained that indicates a foreign
power or its agent is conducting intelligence operations or terrorist activities
against the United States, an FBI agent at a field office will contact the FBI's
Intelligence Division in Washington, D.C., regarding the surveillance proposal.
Supervisors within the Intelligence Division will either send it back down to the
field office for further investigation or pass it along to agents with the division for
processing. Normally, a ten- to fifteen-page package is compiled detailing the
surveillance request and relevant law. The package is then reviewed by the FBI's
legal counsel. If approved, it is sent to the Office of Intelligence Policy and
Review (OIPR), within the Department of Justice, for examination. Packages
concerning the targeting of U.S. persons are frequently returned to the Intelli-
gence Division for additional documentation, while packages for other targets
are only occasionally sent back down. If the package passes OIPR scrutiny, it is
then sent back to the Intelligence Division for forwarding to the FBI's legal
counsel for additional examination. The surveillance application package is then
examined by the FBI's deputy director, and if it passes muster, it is presented to
the director. Some requests are killed at this level. Finally, if the package is still
considered sound, it is forwarded to the Office of the Attorney General, where
the Attorney General must determine whether the application is warranted. It is
extremely rare for a package to be killed at this stage. The next step is exami-
nation by the FISA court. The amount of time required between an application's
first being brought to the attention of the Intelligence Division and the time it
reaches the FISA court approaches three months. It is not uncommon, however,
39. Id. at 3.
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for the Intelligence Division to work on a case for more than one year after a field
agent has forwarded a surveillance proposal.
Military procedures for FISA requests are quite similar. Again, FISA requests
begin to be processed when investigation leads to information that indicates a foreign
power or its agent is conducting intelligence operations or terrorist activities against
the United States. At that time an intelligence officer or agent proceeds with his initial
report to the Judge Advocate General (JAG) office of his service. If the JAG believes
the request is valid, both the officer and JAG counsel advise OIPR, where the request
is further scrutinized. If it merits further consideration, a formal warrant application
is drafted by OIPR. The application then goes back to the military for review by
intelligence personnel and JAG attorneys. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is then
presented with the application for further examination. If the Deputy Secretary cer-
tifies the application, it then returns to OIPR where it is reviewed again. If everything
is in order, the application is presented to the Special Assistant to the Attorney Gen-
eral. Here it must successfully pass another review. If it does, the Attorney General
himself must examine the application and supporting facts and determine whether the
application is warranted and contains all the proper documentation to be filed with
the FISA court.
The procedure currently utilized by the CIA is not known. Attorneys with the
agency would not reveal any information pertaining to the subject.
Under both the FBI and military procedures, a warrant application can be
denied at any step in the review process before it reaches the court, and many are
at virtually every rung of the ladder. However, a denial at any stage does not kill
the possibility of its later resubmission with further factual documentation. 40 A
type of gallows humor has developed among those intelligence officers and
agents associated with the process, as they nervously joke about who will be the
first to have an application turned down by the Court.
C. COMPARTMENTALIZATION
Third, intelligence information is highly compartmentalized. More often than
not an analyst is purposely not made aware of certain information even though
it would have a direct bearing on his or her work. The analyst is judged not to
have "the need to know." Possession of a secret clearance does not automatically
gain access to all materials labeled "secret." An analyst therefore may not be
aware that information is being withheld until someone judges the analyst as
having the "need to know" and subsequently shares the information with him or
her. These decisions are based on the manner in which the government obtained
the information. Information from highly guarded sources has extremely limited
dissemination. It is not improbable that similar situations have arisen in regard to
40. Interview with Mary C. Lawton, Esq., Counsel for Intelligence Policy, Office of Intelligence
Policy and Review, Department of Justice, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 28, 1988).
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formulating FISA requests, and information has been withheld either knowingly
or unknowingly from those assembling the basis for the surveillance applica-
tion. 4 1 Further, this, in essence, is what happens every time a FISA court judge
hears warrant applications; the judges were regarded as not having a "need to
know" when the act was written and resultingly are usually not told the partic-
ulars of the basis for the surveillance request. As Admiral Turner notes, the
determination "that an individual who is to be targeted is very likely an agent of
a foreign power quite often rests upon intelligence garnered from human sources.
There is a limit to how widespread one can let information about human sources
become and still feel you are fulfilling your obligation to that source."42
D. LOOSENING JUDICIAL CONSTRAINTS
If the statute were changed and FISA judges were allowed to examine the
propriety of, and necessity for, all surveillance requests, other problems would
crop up. First, of course, is the age-old constitutional debate concerning sub-
stantive judicial review of defense, foreign affairs, and intelligence decisions. A
greater role would place judges between the proverbial rock and a hard place,
between being the lackey of, or competitor with, the legislative and executive
branches. The Pandora's box of congressional versus executive control of foreign
policy would be opened still further.
Another problem is the lack of intelligence training received by judges as-
signed to the FISA court. Intelligence personnel undergo significant amounts of
training to improve their analytical skills. Currently, FISA judges get a quick and
shallow overview of the system and their place in it, a situation not likely to
change even if they were to be granted greater access to supporting information.
While they would make decisions regarding the validity of information support-
ing the electronic surveillance applications, they would have neither knowledge
on the particular topic nor training in the intelligence field on which to base an
independent decision. According to an official familiar with the court's opera-
tions, many of the judges appear extremely naive during their early years on the
court, but most "wise up" as they handle more cases. Are these really cases of
naivet6, or does "herd mentality" play a role? It is probably a little of both.
V. Conclusion
While the need to strike a sound balance between the need for electronic
surveillance and the protection of civil liberties lies at the heart of the statute, it
41. A recent example, albeit in a different context, occurred with regard to the putting together
of the original drug trafficking indictment against Panama's former leader, General Manuel Noriega,
in February 1988. Federal prosecutors were not given full access to CIA files at that time. Not until
after Noriega surrendered to the United States on Jan. 3, 1990, were federal prosecutors from Miami
allowed to review additional files on the General at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia.
42. Turner, supra note 19, at 1.
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is disturbing to note that not one judge sitting on the FISA court has ever denied
any of the electronic surveillance applications that have passed before the court.
Many believe this is a tribute to a highly professional and finely tuned apparatus
established to deal with just such problems.
On the other hand, owing to pitfalls noted earlier, namely "herd mentality,"
circular reporting, and compartmentalization, the validity of the information
supporting surveillance requests and the analysis of that information can be
affected. Some of these pitfalls have been overcome by the rigorous review cycle
imposed on the application process. FISA's perfect record has created a great
deal of pressure within the community to leave no stone unturned in any prep-
aration for a warrant request. Officials are justifiably proud of their achievement.
But unending suspicions by those who have no access to, or insight into, the
FISA process will not be assuaged.
Operationally speaking, FISA's passage has led to increased cooperation be-
tween the intelligence community and the telecommunications industry in the
former's efforts to combat foreign intelligence activities. The industry now feels
secure in its participation in these clandestine endeavors, as each tap is preceded
by a federal warrant; it believes it is effectively shielded legally from someone's
ability to bring a successful suit.
As for the judiciary, its role has been limited to ensuring formalistic adherence
to very narrow requirements that are not much more involved than making sure
that the executive branch has dotted all its "I's" and crossed all its "T's." As
Senator Malcolm Wallop noted at the time of FISA's passage, this function is at
best a clerical and managerial one that could be performed by the Office of
Management and Budget, the Government Accounting Office, or the staff of any
congressional committee. 43 Under his or any other interpretation, the judiciary's
role is certainly less than judicial. While FISA's supporters hurriedly point to the
early committee report 4 that appears to brush aside any arguments criticizing
FISA, both they and the committee miss the point; compliance with the act's
language, forcing judges to grant surveillance requests if rudimentary require-
ments are met, neutralizes their role in the judicial process and effectively forces
them to function as if they were an organ of the executive branch. The judiciary's
inability to look behind the vast majority of applications to determine the ne-
cessity of the proposed surveillance operation does not allow for an impartial
verification of FISA's supposed protections. Moreover, it defeats the ostensible
purpose of the statute: to provide a reasonable warrant procedure governing
foreign intelligence surveillance. Verification is not unreasonable. One must not
confuse the subjection of intelligence activities to a law with window dressing
43. See Pub. L. No. 95-511, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (92 Stat. 1783) 4043.
While this statement is now discounted by some as simple politicking at that time, Senator Wallop's
comments have proven true.
44. H.R. REP. No. 974, supra note 27.
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that binds the judiciary's hands. Under the present state of the law, true judicial
participation in the FISA process is effectively nonexistent.
For all these reasons, the current FISA procedures offer a mixed bag of results.
What has developed is a system that works well before a surveillance request
reaches the bench, but does not allow the judges to function as judges. A
reexamination of the existing procedures should be made with a determination as
to whether FISA court judges should or can be allowed to look behind all
surveillance requests. If the judges are not granted this authority, a further
determination should be made as to whether the balance between protections of
civil liberties and the dangers of foreign threats might be better served by the
delegation of FISA review authority to a congressional intelligence panel or by
the establishment of a small body outside the control of the executive branch to
undertake such activities. This would keep pressures for collusion at a minimum
and assuage the legal fears of our telecommunications industry. With an adequate
and reasonable review mechanism, FISA could provide verifiable protections for
civil liberties. At present, however, federal district judges now assigned to the
FISA court could better serve the public interest back in their own home districts.
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